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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
RA Y~IOND S. KING,
Pla.in.tiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

HOvVARD

FIR.~I

Case No. 8201

and PAUL J. COX,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF· OF APPELLANT

PRELI~IINARY

STATEMENT

Throughout this Brief, Appellant 'vill be referred to
as plaintiff, and respondents will be referred to as defendants. All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF F'ACT·S
The appeal is from a judginent in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. The cause was tried to the
Court without a jury. The judgment terminated plaintiff's lease on certain premises in Washington County
and a'varded defendants $242.25.
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Defendants own real property at Springdale, Washington County. On the property, they operate a grocery
store, a nine (9) unit motel and a cafe (R-160).
In early Spring 1950, plaintiff and defendant Fir1n
discussed the feasibility of operating a soft ice crea1n
1nachine in the grocery store at Springdale (R-26, 161).
During the Summer of 1950, plaintiff placed in the
grocery store a soft ice cream 1nachine. It opera ted
during the summer but \vas not as successful as was
desired because of the inadequacy of the "Tater supply
at Springdale (R-26, 27).
In the Fall of 1950, plaintiff and defendant :B-,ir1n
discussed the possibility of constructing a separate building in \vhich to operate soft ice crean1 1nachines (R-28).
Plaintiff furnished to defendant photographs of the kind
of building in which such businesses \Vere carried on and
in the Spring of 1951 defendants constructed a structure
'vhich vvas to house the Frosty Freeze place of business.
The arrangements for the use of the building and for its
equipment were contained in a document entitled "Lease",
dated the 1st day of Nlay, 1951, and executed on the 18th
of June, 1951. This exhibit speaks of the building a8
though it vvere in existence on the 1st of ~lay. As a
n1a tter of fact, the building "·as still in the process of
construction at the time of the lease.
The lease provided generally for a leasing of the
real property on \vhich the Frosty F'reeze stand wa:s
constructed, de,scribes generally the business to be conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ducted, and provides for a $50.00 per month rental or
57o of the gross sales. It specifically provides that the
Lessors shall furnish sufficient water to the Lessee for
the operation of the business. The lease provides that
the rent shall be paid on the lst of the month and provides for a twenty (20) day grace period (Exhibit "5").
The tern1 of the lease is for a period of six ( 6) years, or
from the 1st of l\Iay, 1951, to the 1st of May, 1957. The
Frosty Freeze building was not completed by the 1st of
l\Iay, 1951 and plaintiff 'vas not given possession until
the 1st of July, 1951. Even at the time of his posses·sion,
the building had not been co1npleted as was conten1plated
by the parties ( R-28, 29).
vVhen plaintiff took over the unfinished building on
July 1st, sufficient vvater had not been supplied and the
soft ice cream machinery 'vas not placed in operation.
On August 1, 1951, defendant Firm con1pleted and made
available to plaintiff 'vater from a well (R-62). Fro1n the
1st of August and as long as the well water was available, plaintiff vvas able to operate his s'Oft ice crea1n
machinery and hardening cabinets. In 1952 the well had
been abandoned by defendants and there was no adequate
'vater supply furnished to plaintiff for the operation of
the ~soft ice cream machinery.
Because of the failure to have the Frosty Freeze
place of business co1npleted and the inability of defendants to supply adequate water prior to August 1, 1951,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff and defendant Firn1 agreed that for the fir~t
year of operation instead of 5o/o of the gross, plaintiff
would pay 5o/o of the net.
The Frosty F'reeze business \Vas located in the
n1outh of Zion Canyon, was a seasonal operation and the
lease conten1plated operation fro1n )Jay t'hrough October
of each year.
\Vhen plaintiff started his operation for the 1952
season, because the water supply \vas inadequate, he, at
a cost of $129.68, equipped his soft ice crea1n machines
\Vi th an air cooler so that it could be opera ted in spite of
the lack of a sufficient water supply ( R-67).
Plaintiff continued to operate the ice crean1 business
during the summer of 1952 and \vas personally present
until approximately the 1st of August, 1952. In July,
1952, plaintiff and defendant Firm discussed the first
year of

operati~on.

Plaintiff testified that as a result of

the conversation, the first year of operation \vas to end
on the 1st of August, 1952. That for that first year,
plaintiff \vas to pay as rent 57o of the net of the Ftosty
F'reeze business. Defendants dispute the day of terminati~on

of the first year of operation, and the Court found

that \vhat vvas intended \vas the first season of operation
rather than the first year of operation and that the
season of operation ended 'vith Octoher, 1951 (R-78,
Findings of Fact 10 and 11, File Page 23).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·On the 2Gth of July, defendants served on plaintiff
notice of ter1nination of lease, "\vhich de1nanded that plaintiff pay 5% of the gross sales for the period Thfay, 1951
to O'ctober, 1951 and 5% of the gross sales fro1n 1fay,
1952 to date of receipt (Exhibit "7"). The notice was
served on plaintiff on the 26th day of Jhly, 1952 and
de1nands iininediate possession of the premises from
plaintiff. On the 19th of August, 1952, plaintiff presented
an accounting to the defendants (Exhibit "8"), and
tendered his check in the suin of $100.00 to apply on the
rental of the Frosty F·reeze pren1ises. The accounting
sho\vs that on the basis of net proceeds, there was
no rent due and owing, but on the basis of gross proeeeds,
there would have been approxilnately $355.00 owing fron1
plaintiff to defendants.
Defendants refused to accept the tender of the 19th
of August. On the 23rd of August, defendant Firn1 padlocked the Frosty Freeze building. At that time, plaintiff
\Vas out of the State. TJ pon his return, he requested
pern1ission to reinove soine of his things from the Frosty
Freeze premises and defendant Firm informed hi1n that
he could not let him in.
Plaintrff cominenced this action against the defendants alleging that he had been unlawfully, wrongfully and
in violation of his rights dispossessed of the F·rosty
Freeze premises. Plaintiff alleged that he had been danlaged by reason of the

defendant~s'

failure to furnish suffi-

cient water. He set forth that there was an open account
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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due and owing to him by defendants in excess of the
amount of rent which, under any circumstance, might he
due and owing by plaintiff to defendants. He alleged
that he had suffered damages. from the loss of his place
of business, its inventory of p·erishables and alleged conversion of the equipment which was in place in the Frosty
Freeze building. He also prayed damages for future
loss of p-rofits from the F'rosty F:reeze business.
1

Defendants' answer alleged that they rightfully
repossessed the premises and did lawfully refuse plaintiff's request to return and en·ter the F'rosty Freeze
building. Defendants' prayer of their counterclaim asks
for rental due and owing on the premises and also alleged
the conversion of certain property fnr which they prayed
judgment in the sum of $500.00.
After the ~trial, th·e c·ourt made its Findings of F·act,
Conclusions of Law and Decree and found the· existence
of the lease, its terms and the general evidence concerning the construction of the building. The Court found in
Paragraph 4, that there was an agreement for the year
1951 that the rent w~s. to be 5% of the net proceeds, instead of 5% of the gross p-roceeds. 'The Court found in
Paragraph 5 that the water supply was not adequate for
the operation of the soft ice cream machines and that the
defendants caused a well t o be dug. The Court further
1

found that the lack of a sufficient water sup·ply caus.ed
loss and expense to plaintiff but re.fused to find the
amount of such expense. The Court also found ·that no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accounting was made by plaintiff until August 18 or 19,
1952 at which time Exhibit "A" and the check for $100.00
was tendered to the defendants. The Court then found
tha~t no net profits were realized in the year 1951 and that
the gross proceeds from the business from May 18, 1952.
to July 31, 1952 was in the sum of $3,583.15 and that 5%
of such amount was $179.15 (Paragraph 11 of the Findings). It further found that on J:uly 26th, the date o:f
the n'otice of termination, there was $87.10 due from
plaintiff to defendants a.s rental.
F'inding No. 12 is to the effect that defendants had
executed and delivered to plaintiff the promissory note
and cha~ttel mortgage (Exhibits "10" and "11") in the
face amount of $2,146.00; that on this note there was
paid on or a!bout June 16, 1952, $1,942.50; that there re'""
mains owing $346.00 t'ogether with interest. This promissory note was given by defendants to plaintiff to replace
a note for $1800.00 (Exhibit "B") and to pay the price of
equipment furnished by plaintiff to defendants, a list
of which is shown as Exhibit "C". The note was secured
by chattel mortgage on a large number of items in use
in de'fendan~ts' grocery store, cafe, motel and the Frosty
Freeze place of business.
The note and mortgage both required the signature
of the wife of defendant Firm. When presented for her
signature, she refused to ~ign either the mortgage or the·
note. The mortgage and note for $2,146.00 were never
recorded and subsequent to their preparation and presenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tation, defendants disavo\ved the an1ount of the note and
clai1ned that it was not due. On June 16, 1952, defendants
paid to pl aintiff $1,967.50. Of this an1ount, $1942.50 "~as
on the note and Inortgage of Septen1ber 1, 1952. On
the face of the note is typed a statement that the an1ount
of $1967.50 was received in full for the note and interest,
that $25.00 of the a1nount \Yas for attorney'8 fees for
drawing up unused papers. It is admitted hy all parties
that the unused papers referred to \vere the note and
n1ortgage in the sum o:f $2,146.00 (R-98-100, 130-132, 177,
178 and 183). Finding No. 13 is that a $25.00 attorney's
fee was for drawing of ne\Y papers. The Court found
that the $346.00 \Vas owing under the chattel mortgage
and \Vas not on open account. It \Vas, therefore, n'ot due
fro1n defendants to pl aintiff at the tilne the notice of
ter1nination of lease was delivered. r~rhe Court concluded
that the $346.00 was not due until the vear 1954 and that
there \\Tas due and owing a:s delinquent rent the sun1 of
$242.25.
1

1

The Court throughout the Findings, Conclusions of
La\V and Decree, refused to accept the plain tiff's records,
books and esti1nates concerning losses and da1nages
though there \vas no contrary evidence introduced by
defendants concerning thos·e various items.
STA'TEl\[ENT OF POINTS R.ELIED ON"
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY AND "\VRONGFULLY
DISPOSSESSED PLAINTIFF AND TERMINATED HIS
LEASE.
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ARGU~1ENT

POINT I.
DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY AND WRONGFULLY
DISPOSSESSED PLAINTIFF AND TERMINATED HIS
LEASE.

A great n1ajority ·of the facts in this action are unrli~puted.

The undisputed facts sho\v that the defendants

wTongfun~~

ter1ninated plaintiff's

lea~e.

The follo,ving

facts are undisputed:

( 1)

That during the year 193:2, defendants did not

furni~h ~ufficient

of the

~oft

C.!)
1~).):!,

\Vater to plaintiff for the operation

ice crea1nrnachines.
rl.,hat during the year 1951 and until June 16,

defendant~

\Vere indebted to plaintiff in the sum of

$194:2.50.
( ;~)

rrhat frorn J unP lG until ..._:\ugust 23, 1952, de-

fendants w·ere indebted to plaintiff in the su1n of $346.00
on open account.
( -l-)
tiff'~

oF

rflhat

defendant~

took OYer forcihly frOlU plain-

e1n plo ~·ees possession of the :F'rosty }'reeze place

hn~ine:-;;--;

(.))

on the

~3rd

of August, 1D5:!.

'That thereafter,

c·xelnsi\·e and continuous
pre1ni~es

defendant~

po~~e~~ion

and all eqniprnent and

haYe been in sole,

of the Frosty Freeze

~upplies

therein.
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( 6) That on Octo ber 6, 1952, defendants refused
plaintiff permission to re-enter and remove personal
properties from the Fr'osty F'reeze premises.
1

(7) That the Frosty Freeze building has never been
completed as contemplated. by the p·art'ies.
That the failure to furnish sufficient water for
the operation o:f the F'r'osty Freeze business and the failure to complete the Frosty Freeze buiiding have caused
damage to pl'aintiff.
(8)

(9) T·hat the wife of defendant Firm, refused to
sign the chattel mortgage and p·romissory note and that
none of the parties considered the chattel mortgage and
promissory note for $2146.00 as a valid instrument.
It is plaintiff's position that at no time prior to the
23rd of August, was he indebted in any way to the defendants; that his elaims against defendants more than
offset any sum which 0ould possibly be due and owing
to defendants as rent on the Frosty Freeze place of business.
The first and major ·setoff was the amount due under
the first p-romissory note and chatte1 mortgage in the
sum of $1800.00. Second, the sums that became due and
owing fr'om defendants to plaintiff by reason of his furn'ishing ·equip·ment an·d material in the Fall o:f 1951 and
Spring of 1952, amounted to $346.00 and is due on open
account. These two items made up the chattel mortgage
for the 'Sum of $2,146.00.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.r\.pparently, the Court misread the receipt which was
typed on defendants' Exhibit "B" for in the Court's finding, it stated that the $25.00 item was for new papers
'vhen as an actual fact the receipt stated that the $25.00
'vas for dra,ving up of u,nused papers. The unused papers
'vere t'he chattel mortgage and pron1i·ssory note which
:\Irs. F'irn1 refused to sign. The $346.00 item could only
be due on open account and would b': a proper o:ffset
against the sun1s con1ing due as rent for the Frosty
F:reeze pre1nises.
1

The most that could possibly be due to defendants
as rent under the interpretation 1nost favorable to them,
'vhich '"'as adopted by the Ciourt, is the sum of $242.25,
1nore than $100.00 less than the amount owed to plaintiff
on open account.
The offset for equipment and materials furnished by
plaintiff to defendants are in amounts agreed upon by
the parties prior to the time when the dispute arose.
The anrount is liquidated and ce~rtainly would be a proper
setoff against any rent failing due on the F:rosty Freeze
premises.
There was no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the
parties to the promissory note that it was not a valid
and subsisting instrument. It was. never signed by one
of the parties, namely, Mrs. Howard F'irm, and in both
instruments a place is provided for her signature and in
the body of the docun1ents she is named as a party. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rule seen1s clear and unequivocal that \Yhere a doeu1nent
anticipates the signature of a nu1nber of person~ and
son1e of the people do not sign and refuse to becon1e parties to the agree1nent, the docu1nent itself i~ not a binding instrument. The rule is stated n1ost succinctly in
Ely v. Phillips, 89 ,-r. \T a. 580, 109 S.E. 808, in the follo\\·ing language :
'"The authorities are unifor1n in the holding
that persons signing a contract prepared for
signature of other persons, to be affixed along
vvith theirs, and in tended to be signed by all of the
parties nan1ed in it, are not bound until all have
signed it and incur no obligation, if any of those
who \Vere to have signed it refuse to do ~o.', (citing
case)
The rule as applied by the l'T tah Courts has been
st~ted ]n S'f.ockya.rds fVa.t . Bank of South 01nalza 1).
Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 2-1-5 J>ac. 9GG. r_rhere the parties \vere
concerned with a n1ortgage vvhich had not been executed
by some of the partie·s \vhose na1nes appeared in the body
of the 1nortgage. The l:tah Court in applying the rule
set forth above states our la\\' in the follo\ving language,
page 975:

"* * * Again, it is well settled that, \vhere
a bill, note, or n1ortgage, or other contract, is
~signed and delivered by one on condition that
another, or :others, shall also sign the contract
and become obligated thereon, and, if such condition is not fulfilled, th.e contract as to hiln \Vho
signed and delivered it is of no binding effect as
between the original parties or their privies, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a~signs

having no equities other or greater than
those of the original parties. }[artineau v. Han~on, -l-7 Utah 549, 155 l). 432; Central Bank v.
Stephens, ;)~ Utah 358, 199 J->. 1018; 1 Joyce, Defenses to Com. Paper (2d Ed.) Sections 486 to 490.
\ Vhere a stockholder of a bank executed a note to
it on conditi on that all other stockholders should
pay an1ounts proportionate to their shareholdings,
the n1aker cannot be held liable on the note, except
to a holder in due course, on a failure of fulfillnlent ·of such condition. Bank of Tallassee v.
Jordan, 200 Ala. 182, 75 So. 930. * * *"
1

See also .11nthony 1J1acaron£ C1o. r. }lun.z,iato, 5 Cal.
_A_ pp. ~d :lSS, 43 P. 2d 315.
T'here i~ no dispute a bout the fact that ~Irs. Firn1
did not sign either the note or 1nortgage, that the docunlents \Yere never recorded and as defendant Cox stated,
as far a~ he \Yas c-oncerned the $2,14-6.00 n1ortgage \vas a
nullity and did not have any force or effect (R-184).
It is not until the Court 111ade its Findings of F'act that
any part~:" gave any force or effect to the n1ortgage and
pro1nissor~~ note dated }[arch 1, 1952. \~Vhen the pay1nent
of ,J nne 16, 1~):):_2 \vas 1nade, there "Tas typed on the face
of the note dated Septe1nher 1, 1951, Exhibit "B", the
following:
"J nne 16 1952
' Utah
Springdale,
"Received of Paul Cox $1967.50 as pay111ent
of principal in full and interest to date plus $:.?;)
for attorneys fee for drawing up unused papers.
S/ Ray1nond S. King
\Vitness:
S/ Jesse \\... I-Iigley"
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This statement sho\YS beyond dispute the position of
plain tiff concerning the note dated nia.rch 1, 1 95~ and
refers to the note and chattel 1nortgage as "unused
papers".
Whether or not the note of ~farch 1, 1952 is a valid
and subsisting document is of crucial ilnportance for if
it is not a valid and subsisting docun1ent, then the Court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree n1nst
all fall. For then, the $346.00 ovving by defendants to
pl,aintiff, would be ovving on an open account. It would he
a proper setoff against any amounts due and owing fron1
plaintiff to defendants as rent and 'vould n1ore than wipe
out the $242.25 which the Court finds was the an1ount
o'f rent ovving by plaintiff to defendants. It would appear, therefore, that the $346.00 being owed by defendants to plaintiff on an open account, teTinination of the
lea:se for failure to pay rent in the sun1 of $:2-12.25 \vas
wrongful and \Yould not justify in any \vay the terinination of the lease by defendants.
No proper notice of ter1nination of lease or de1na.nd
ha'S ever been made upon plaintiff by defendants. Their
de1nand of July 26th was greatly in excess of the a1nounts
which were actually due as rent on the Frosty Freeze
premises. The notice of ter1nina tion of lease n1ake'S deInand on plaintiff for 5% of the gross sales for the period
1\fay 1, 1951 to October, 1951, and the Court found, as \\'"as
relatively undisputed, that for that p·eriod of time deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendants had agreed \Yith plaintiff that he was to have
the pre1nises for 57o of the net earned in the business
rather than 5/o of the gross.
In response to the notice of ter1nina tion of lease,
plaintiff gave a proper accounting of the incorne, both
net and gross, frotn the· Frosty Freeze business. Exhibit
HS", dated August 15, 1952, not only ~ho\vs the net proceeds but sho\vs the gross arnounts \\~hich \Vere received
in the business. r_l_lhe tender of $100.00, under protest,
n1ade in good faith, \vas n1ore than was due on the date
on \vhich the notice to ter1ninate \Vas served. The Court
found that as of July 26th, \vhen defendants served the
notice of ter1nination, there \Vas only $87.10 due and owing· by plaintiff for rent on the pre1nises. The response
to this "Tas a tender of $100.00.
J)efendants never did co1nply \Vith the terrns of the
lea:-;e and furnish to plaintiff sufficient \Vater to operate
the Frosty :F,reeze business except for a few months follo,ving August 1, 1951. It \Vas found that there never
,,~as sufficient \Vater furnished b~T defendants to plaintiff
after 1951 and they \Vere, therefore, at all tin1es in default in their perfor1nance under the ter1ns of the lease.
This default necessitated the installation of a less efficit•nt s:Tsten1 of cooling the soft ice cream machines and
necess i ta ted that plain tiff install on the Inachines air
1

coolers \vhieh cost $129.68 (R-67). The air coolers \Vere
only tvvo-thirds as efficient as \vere the \Vater cooling
units (R-69). This caused a

los~

to plaintiff in the ordi-
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nary operation of the lnaehines of $7 .~0 per day. rrhe
Court found that the failure to furnish \Vater dan1aged
plaintiff but would not find the an1ount of da1na.ge even
though plaintiff's evidence as to an1ount is undisputed.
The Utah la\\ has always been clear and unequivocal
that a repossession by a landowner through forcible entry and detainer is a \vrongful action on his part and
the Courts have determined that the tenant 1nust be restored to possession and is entitled to da1nages suffered
fro1n ·such \vrongful dispossession by th-e owner.
7

In the ease of Paxton 1:. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.
2d 903, this Court set forth its view concerning repossessions by rig•htful O\vners of property. After stating
that a repossessor cannot in an action for \Vrongful detainer prove ·his right to possession or his title, the Court
set forth the logic behind our wrongful and forcrble entry
statute in the follo\ving language, page 906:
"Proceedings under the forcible entry and
detainer statute are sun11na.ry in character, speedy
in enforcement, and penal for violation thereof.
The purpose of the statute is to provide a speedy
re1nedy, su1nmary in character, to obtain possession of real property. Even rightful owners should
not take the law into their own hands and proceed
to recover possession by violence, or by entry
in the nighttilne, or during the absence of the
occupants of any real property."
\Vhile under the decision of the trial court plaintiff's
right to da1nages \Yas unnecessary, it \\.,.ould appear that
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the question of \vhether or not in a wrongful entry and
foreible detainer action the tenant is entitled to damages,
should be set at rest.
The 1natter of a tenant's right to damages for wrongful eviction \vas considered by this Court in the case of
Hargra l"(J

£:.

Leigh_, 73 Utah 178, 273 Pac. 298. There the

Court approved an a\vard to the tenant of $650.00 for
wTongful eviction by the landlord. It \Vould appear that
the general rule is that either \Vith or without a restoration of the pre1nises, a tenant \Vrongfully evicted may
1>e

a w·arded the da1nages suffered by him.
Nee also Ri.cltardson v. PTidnzore, 97 Cal. App. 2d,

12-t, :217 P. :2d 113, 17 A.L.R.. 2d 929, where damages were
discussed at length and the . A. ppellate Court held that
dan1ages \Vere properly recoverable in a wrongful eviction case.
Plaintiff sub1nits that the $346.00 owed him by de-fendants \Vas on open account due and payable by the
defendants; that it was a proper and legitimate setoff
to any

sun1~

\vhich became due and owing from plaintiff

to defendants for rent on the F·rosty Freeze place of
business. In addition to said ite1n, the failure of defendants to properly perform the covenants and tern1s of the
lease agreen1en t should be considered in granting them
a right of termination.
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The seizure by defendants of possession of the
Frosty Freeze business on August 23rd \Vas wrongful
and unlawful and plaintiff is entitled to all of the dania:ges suffered by him as· a result of said seizure; that the
trial court's decision denying any recovery to plaintiff
and decreeing termination of the lease is con tra.ry to the
law and unsupported by the evidence; that this Court
should reverse said decision and grant to plaintiff a ne"T
trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 'vere
erroneous and unlawful, and that plaintiff should be
granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RA WLIN·GS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK and
DWIGHT L. KING
Counsel for Appellant

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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